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Abstract. Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms have recently
come to the fore as a tool to deal with imperfect rationality. They, in
fact, incentivize people with no contingent reasoning skills to “follow the
protocol” and be honest. However, their exact power is still to be deter-
mined. For example, even for settings relatively well understood, such as
binary allocation problems, it is not clear when optimal solutions can be
computed with OSP mechanisms.
We here consider this question for the large class of set system problems,
where selfish agents with imperfect rationality own elements whose cost
can take one among few values. In our main result, we give a char-
acterization of the instances for which the optimum is possible. The
mechanism we provide uses a combination of ascending and descending
auctions, thus extending to a large class of settings a design paradigm
for OSP mechanisms recently introduced in [9]. Finally, we dig deeper in
the characterizing property and observe that the set of conditions can be
quickly verified algorithmically. The combination of our mechanism and
algorithmic characterization gives rise to the first example of automated
mechanism design for OSP.
Keywords: Extensive Form Mechanisms · Bounded Rationality.
1 Introduction
The role of incentives in the design of algorithms has been a very active research
area in the last two decades. Mechanism design has as its main objective the
alignment of the objectives of the designer (e.g., optimality of the solution)
with those of self-interested agents (e.g., maximize their utility). The crucial
? This author is partially supported by GNCS-INdAM and by the Italian MIUR PRIN
2017 Project ALGADIMAR “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets”.
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assumption made in the area is that these self-interested agents have perfect
rationality: they will be able to ascertain that there is no point in strategizing,
whenever the mechanism is proved to be truthful (a.k.a., strategyproof (SP)).
Unfortunately this might be too strong an assumption for practical applica-
tions of these theoretically sound mechanisms. Even for the well-known second-
price auction, bidders lie when submitting sealed bids but are truthful when the
mechanism is implemented via an ascending auction [14]. Intuitively, this means
that it is easier to understand how to play the latter implementation of Vickrey
auction, whilst the former can be confusing for agents with imperfect rationality.
The recent definition of obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms [16] formal-
izes how a different (extensive-form) implementation can make it obvious for an
agent to decide what strategy to adopt. Roughly speaking, in OSP mechanisms,
the utility for the worst scenario when truth-telling is at least as good as that
of the best scenario when cheating. Li [16] proves that OSP mechanisms are
obvious to understand for people without any contingent reasoning skill.
Research about the power of OSP mechanisms has barely scratched the sur-
face. While it is clear that ascending/descending price auctions are OSP (as it
is obvious for a bidder to decide whether to quit the auction or not), few gen-
eral paradigms are known for the design of OSP mechanisms that return “good”
(e.g., optimal) solutions. Deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanisms [18] are OSP
(as they essentially are ascending price auctions), but unfortunately their per-
formance (approximation guarantee) for several optimization problems is quite
poor compared to what strategyproof mechanisms can do [6, 9]. A combination
of ascending and descending auctions has recently been given in [9] for the well-
known scheduling related machines problem; the mechanism and its analysis rely
on a generalization of the cycle monotonicity (CMON) technique, that allows to
focus on the algorithmic component of OSP mechanisms.
A setting which is relatively better understood is the case of binary allocation
problems, such as set systems. Here we are given a ground set of elements, each
controlled by a selfish agent who privately knows the cost of the element, and
a set of feasible solutions, i.e., subsets of elements in the ground set. The cost
of each solution is the sum of the costs of its elements. The objective is to
compute the feasible solution of minimum cost. Each agent can then be either
selected or not. We normalize the utility of unselected agents to 0, whilst we use
a quasi-linear utility for the selected agents, defined as the difference between the
payment received from the mechanism and the cost of the element she contributes
to the chosen solution. Li characterizes the class of OSP mechanisms for binary
allocation problems, when the agents’ domain is [tmin, tmax], in terms of personal
clock auctions (PCAs) – essentially, each agent faces either a descending or an
ascending price auction. We are interested in the power of OSP mechanisms; in
particular when can we design an OSP optimal mechanism for set systems?
To highlight the issues behind this question, let us consider a special set
system, namely path auctions, as introduced in [19]. In this problem, each edge
corresponds to a link that is owned by a selfish agent, the cost for using link i is
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some private nonnegative value ti which is known only to agent i, and the goal
is to pick the shortest path between two given nodes s and t.
Can we compute the shortest path whilst guaranteeing OSP? For a graph
consisting of parallel links, we know from [16] that the answer is yes via a simple
descending auction to select the cheaper edge. Already for slightly more general
graphs, the answer is unclear. Consider, for example, the graph in Figure 1(a).
To make things even simpler let us restrict to a two-value domain {L,H}, i.e.,
edges cost either L or H > 2L. (Note that this means that we cannot rely on the
PCA characterization, since our domains are not continuous.) In this setting, a
simple OSP mechanism can be designed by querying the agents according to the
implementation tree (i.e., a querying protocol where different actions are taken
according to the answers received) in Figure 1(b). This algorithm is augmented
with the following payments: H for edges in the selected path, 0 otherwise. It is
not hard to see that, for every edge e, it is not possible that e is selected when she
declares that her type is H and it is not selected when she says L. In particular,
edge (s, t) is always selected when she says L, while the remaining edges are never
selected when they declare H. Then, if e declares her true type, she receives a
utility of H − L if the true type is L and e is selected, and 0 otherwise; by
inspection, she would receive at most the same utility when cheating. It turns
out that this argument is enough to prove that the mechanism is indeed OSP.
Does the same approach work, for example, on the slightly more general graph in
Figure 1(c)? Consider an edge e that is queried before the type of the remaining
edges is known (that is, the first edge to be queried in a sequential mechanism,
or an arbitrary edge in a direct revelation mechanism). Suppose that the type of
this edge is L. If she declares her type truthfully, then the worst that may occur
is that the corresponding path is not selected (that occurs when this path costs
H + L and the alternative path costs 2L), and thus e receives utility 0. If this
edge, instead, cheats and declares H, then it is possible that the corresponding
path is selected (if it costsH+L and the alternative path costs 2H) and e receives
utility H −L. Thus, it is not obvious for an edge e lacking contingent reasoning
skills, to understand that being truthful is dominant. For which graphs can we
then design an OSP optimal mechanism? The goal of this work is to answer this
kind of questions for set system problems.
Fig. 1. Two instances of path auctions are shown in (a) and (c), while (b) is an OSP
mechanism for instance (a).
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Our contribution. Our main result is a complete characterization of OSP
optimal mechanisms for set system problems (which include path auctions as a
special case). To prove our results, we adopt the CMON technique developed
in [9]. CMON is a powerful technique in that it allows to abstract the OSP
constraints (which depend on both the solution – e.g., the shortest path – and
the implementation tree) and reduces the existence of OSP mechanisms to the
absence of negative-weight cycles in a carefully defined graph. This is very similar
to CMON for truthful mechanisms; the difference, however, is that whilst for SP
it is enough to focus on cycles of length two for essentially all domains of interest
[22], for OSP, 2-cycles are in general sufficient only for small domains (of up to
three-values) [9]. Hence, while the necessary condition of our characterization
holds irrespectively of the domain size, since non-negative 2-cycles are always
necessary, our mechanism restricts the agents to have these small domains. The
technical and conceptual challenge left open is then to what extent the necessary
condition are sufficient for larger domains.
Before we discuss our characterization, we exemplify our approach on a re-
stricted version of set systems, namely path auctions on graphs comprised of two
parallel paths, whose edges have two-value domains. We show how the topology
(i.e., number of edges of either path) and values in the domains can change the
OSP-implementability of optimal algorithms. Specifically, we show that our ob-
servation for shortest path on the graph in Figure 1(a) is not an accident as for
all the graphs where a path is a direct edge, we can design an optimum OSP
mechanism no matter what the alternative path looks like. Similarly, we prove
that there are no OSP optimal mechanisms for the graph in Figure 1(c) and
all the graphs where the two paths are composed of the same number (larger
than one) of edges. As for the graphs where neither path is direct and each has
a different number of edges, the existence of an OSP mechanism returning the
shortest path depends on the values in the domains.
We then generalize the setting to any set system problem, wherein agents
have three-value (heterogeneous) domains and fully characterize the properties
needed to design OSP mechanisms.
Main Theorem (informal). There is an OSP optimal mechanism
iff the set of feasible solutions are “aligned” with agent’s subdomain.
The intuition behind the characterization is simple. From OSP CMON, we know
that if an OSP mechanism selects an agent e when she has a “high” cost then it
must select e when she has a “low” cost (akin to monotonicity for strategyproof-
ness). Therefore, to design an OSP optimal mechanism we need to define an
implementation tree which satisfies this property. At each node of the tree, the
domain of the agents is restricted to a particular subdomain, depending on the
particular history; in turn, the set of possible type profiles also shrinks. Hence,
there may solutions that become suboptimal for all type profiles in this set, and
others that are still alive (i.e., optimal for at least one type profile in the set).
When e is asked to separate a high cost from a low cost at node u of the tree,
we then need the alive solutions to be “aligned” for the subdomain at u, which
roughly means that it should never be the case that there are two bid profiles in
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this subdomain for which e belongs to an optimal solution when she has a high
cost and is not part of an optimal solution when she has a low cost. The somehow
surprising extra aspect is that even if the alive solutions were not aligned for one
single subdomain then there would be no way to design an implementation tree
to bypass this misalignment.
The technical definition of alignment has some nuisance to do with the partic-
ular ways in which the OSP monotonicity can be broken, but on the positive side,
rather immediately suggests how to interleave ascending and descending phases
to design an OSP optimal mechanism. This characterization precisely shows how
OSP needs to look at the quality of solutions among set of instances (encoded by
agent subdomains) rather than just the single instance and how this is needed
to inform the shape of the implementation tree. Moreover, this characterization
also enables us to give a testing algorithm, running in time polynomial in the size
of the set system instance, which flags whether an OSP optimal mechanism for
the instance at hand is possible or not. This coupled with our mechanism gives a
sort of automated mechanism design result in that the designer has a blackbox,
comprised of testing algorithm, and possibly our mechanism, to implement the
optimal solution in an OSP way.
Related work. The notion of OSP mechanism has been introduced recently by
[16] and has received a lot of attention in the community. Several works have
focused on understanding better the notion of OSP mechanism, and studying
settings without money, namely matching and voting [2, 4, 17]. An early work
on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms is [10] where the authors
consider OSP mechanisms for machine scheduling and facility location. A more
recent study on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms without money
for machine scheduling is [15]. As mentioned above, a companion paper [9] intro-
duces CMON and gives tight bounds for OSP mechanism for scheduling related
machines. The use of verification [20] for OSP mechanisms is, instead, studied
in [11]. The tradeoff between approximation guarantee (for machine scheduling)
and relaxations of OSP is recently studied in [12].
Research in algorithmic mechanism design [13, 5] has suggested to focus on
“simple” mechanisms to deal with bounded rationality. For example, posted-price
mechanisms received huge attention very recently and have been applied to many
different settings [1, 3, 8, 7] In these mechanisms one’s own bid is immaterial for
the price paid to get some goods of interest. However, posted price mechanisms
do not fully capture the concept of simple mechanisms: e.g., ascending price
auctions are not posted price mechanisms and still turn out to be “simple”.
The automatic generation of mechanisms has been a classic desiderata in
algorithmic mechanism design [23]: indeed, automated mechanisms are easier
to use in practice, where inputs may quickly evolve. However, few results are
known, even for SP mechanisms.
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2 Preliminaries
A mechanism design setting is defined by a set of n selfish agents and a set of
allowed outcomes S. Each agent i has a type ti ∈ Di, where Di is called the
domain of i. The type ti is usually assumed to be private knowledge of agent i.
We let ti(X) ∈ R denote the cost of agent i with type ti for the outcome X ∈ S.
A mechanism is a process for selecting an outcome X ∈ S. To this aim,
the mechanism interacts with agents. Specifically, agent i is observed to take
actions (e.g., saying yes/no) that may depend on her presumed type bi ∈ Di
(e.g., saying yes could “signal” that the presumed type has some properties that
bi alone might enjoy). We say that agent i takes actions compatible with (or
according to) bi to stress this. We highlight that the presumed type bi can be
different from the real type ti.
For a mechanism M, we let M(b) denote the outcome returned by the
mechanism when agents take actions according to their presumed types b =
(b1, . . . , bn). In our context, this outcome is given by a pair (f,p), where f = f(b)
(termed social choice function or, simply, algorithm) maps the actions taken
by the agents according to b to a feasible solution in S, and p = p(b) =
(p1(b), . . . , pn(b)) ∈ Rn maps the actions taken by the agents according to b to
payments from the mechanism to the agents.
Each selfish agent i is equipped with a utility function ui : Di × S → R. For
ti ∈ Di and for an outcome X ∈ S returned by a mechanism M, ui(ti, X) is
the utility that agent i has for outcome X when her type is ti. We define utility
as a quasi-linear combination of payments and costs, i.e., ui(ti,M(bi,b−i)) =
pi(bi,b−i)− ti(f(bi,b−i)).
A mechanism M is strategy-proof (SP) if it holds that ui(ti,M(ti,b−i)) ≥
ui(ti,M(bi,b−i)) for every i, every b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) and every
bi ∈ Di, with ti being the true type of i. That is, in a strategy-proof mechanism
the actions taken according to the true type are dominant for each agent.
We will be focusing on single-parameter settings, that is, the case in which
the private information of each bidder i is a single real number ti and ti(X) can
be expressed as tiwi(X) for some publicly known function wi.
Obvious Strategyproofness. We now formally define the concept of obvi-
ously strategy-proof (deterministic) mechanism. This concept has been intro-
duced in [16]. However, our definition is built on the more accessible ones given
in [2] and [10]. As shown in [4, 17], our definition is equivalent to Li’s.4
Let us first formally model how a mechanism works. An extensive-form mech-
anism M is defined by a directed tree T = (V,E), called the implementation
tree, such that:
– Every leaf ` of the tree is labeled with a possible outcome X(`) ∈ S of the
mechanism;
4 More in detail, our definition of implementation tree is equivalent to the concept of
round-table mechanism in [17]. Consequently, our definition of OSP is equivalent to
the concept of SP-implementation through a round table mechanism, that is proved
to be equivalent to the original definition of OSP.
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– Every internal vertex u ∈ V is labeled by an agent S(u) ∈ [n];
– Every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E is labeled by a subset T (e) ⊆ D = ×iDi of type
profiles such that:
• The subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from the same vertex
u are disjoint, i.e., for every triple of vertices u, v, v′ such that (u, v) ∈ E
and (u, v′) ∈ E, we have that T (u, v) ∩ T (u, v′) = ∅;
• The union of the subsets of profiles labelling the edges outgoing from a non-
root vertex u is equal to the subset of profiles that label the edge going in
u, i.e.,
⋃
v : (u,v)∈E T (u, v) = T (φ(u), u), where φ(u) is the parent of u in T ;
• The union of the subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from the
root vertex r is equal to the set of all profiles, i.e.,
⋃
v : (r,v)∈E T (r, v) = D;
• For every u, v such that (u, v) ∈ E and for every two profiles b,b′ ∈
T (φ(u), u) such that bi = b′i, i = S(u), if b belongs to T (u, v), then b′
must belong to T (u, v) also.
Roughly speaking, the tree represents the steps of the execution of the mech-
anism. As long as the current visited vertex u is not a leaf, the mechanism
interacts with the agent S(u). Different edges outgoing from vertex u are used
for modeling the different actions that agents can take during this interaction
with the mechanism. As suggested above, the action that agent i takes may
depend on her presumed type bi ∈ Di. That is, different presumed types may
correspond to taking different actions, and thus to different edges. The label T (e)
on edge e = (u, v) then lists the type profiles in which the type of S(u) is one
signalled by the actions assigned to e. In other words, when edge e is traversed,
then the mechanism (and the other agents) can infer that the type profile must
be contained in T (e). The execution ends when we reach a leaf ` of the tree. The
mechanism then returns the outcome that labels `.
Observe that, according to the definition above, for every profile b there is
only one leaf ` = `(b) such that b belongs to T (φ(`), `). For this reason we say
that M(b) = X(`). Moreover, for every type profile b and every node u ∈ V ,
we say that b is compatible with u if b ∈ T (φ(u), u). Finally, two profiles b, b′
are said to diverge at vertex u if there are two vertices v, v′ such that (u, v) ∈ E,
(u, v′) ∈ E and b ∈ T (u, v), whereas b′ ∈ T (u, v′). For every node u in a
mechanism M such that there are two profiles b,b′ that diverge at u, we say
that u is a divergent node, and i = S(u) the corresponding divergent agent. For
each agent i, we define the current domain at node u, denoted Di(u), such that
Di(r) = Di for the root r and Di(u) = ∪b∈T (φ(u),u)bi. In words, this is the
set of types of i that are compatible with the actions that i took during the
execution of the mechanism until node u is reached. Indeed, according to the
definition above, at each node u in which i diverges, M partitions Di(u) in k
subsets, where k is the number of children of u, and where for every child v of
u, Di(v) ⊂ Di(u) contains the types of bidder i compatible with the action that
she takes when interacting with the mechanism at node u.
We are now ready to define obvious strategyproofness. An extensive-form
mechanism M is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if for every agent i with real
type ti, for every vertex u such that i = S(u), for every b−i,b′−i (with b′−i
8 D. Ferraioli et al.
not necessarily different from b−i), and for every bi ∈ Di, with bi 6= ti, such
that (ti,b−i) and (bi,b′−i) are compatible with u, but diverge at u, it holds that
ui(ti,M(ti,b−i)) ≥ ui(ti,M(bi,b′−i)). Roughly speaking, an obviously strategy-
proof mechanism requires that, at each time step agent i is asked to take a
decision that depends on her type, the worst utility that she can get if at this
time step she behaves according to her true type is at least the best utility
achievable by behaving as she had a different type. Hence, if a mechanism is
obviously strategy-proof, then it is also strategy-proof. Indeed, the latter requires
that truthful behavior is a dominant strategy when agents know the entire type
profile, whereas the former requires that it continues to be a dominant strategy
even if agents have only a partial knowledge of profiles limited to what they
observed in the mechanism up to the time they are called to take their choices.
We say that an extensive-form mechanism is trivial if for every vertex u ∈ V
and for every two type profiles b,b′, it holds that b and b′ do not diverge at
u. That is, a mechanism is trivial if it never requires agents to take actions
that depend on their type. If a mechanism is not trivial, then there is at least
one divergent node. On the other hand, every execution of a mechanism (i.e.,
every path from the root to a leaf in the mechanism implementation tree) may
go through at most
∑
i(|Di| − 1) divergent nodes, the upper bound being the
case in which at each divergent node u, the agent i = S(u) separates Di(u) in
Di(u) \ {b} and {b} for some b ∈ Di(u).
Cycle-monotonicity for OSP mechanisms. In [9], a technique – that extends
the well-known cycle monotonicity for strategyproofness [21] – is introduced to
study whether a mechanism is OSP. We here recall their results, needed for our
characterization.
Consider an extensive-form mechanismM = (f,p) with implementation tree T .
Definition 1 (separating vertices). A vertex u in the implementation tree T
is αβ-separating for agent i if the following holds: Node u is labelled with i, i.e.,
i = S(u); there are two profiles (α,a−i) and (β,b−i) which are compatible with
u but diverge at u, where a−i,b−i ∈ D−i(u) = ×j 6=iDj(u).
Note that there might exist several αβ-separating vertices for agent i as the
agent may be asked to separate a from b in different paths from the root to a
leaf (but only once for every such path).
Definition 2 (OSP-graph). Let f be a social choice function and T be an
implementation tree. We define for every agent i, the OSP-graph OSP (f,T )i as
follows: There is a node for each type profile in D, and a directed edge e =
((α,a−i), (β,b−i)) for every α, β ∈ Di, α 6= β, and a−i,b−i ∈ D−i(u), where u
is an αβ-separating vertex of T . The weight of the edge is w(e) = α(f(β,b−i))−
α(f(α,a−i)).
Definition 3 (OSP CMON). We say that the OSP cycle monotonicity (OSP
CMON) property holds if, for all i, the graph OSP (f,T )i does not have nega-
tive weight cycles. Moreover, we say that the OSP two-cycle monotonicity (OSP
2CMON) holds if the same is true when considering cycles of length two only,
i.e., cycles with two edges only.
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We now state the relationship between OSP CMON and OSP mechanisms.
Theorem 1 ([9]). A mechanism with implementation tree T is an OSP mech-
anism for a social function f on finite domains if and only if OSP CMON holds.
Theorem 2 ([9]). Let |Di| ≤ 3 for each agent i. A mechanism with implemen-
tation tree T and social choice function f is OSP iff OSP 2CMON holds.
Set systems. In a set system (E,F) we are given a set E of elements and a
family F ⊆ 2E of feasible subsets of E. Each element i ∈ E is controlled by a
selfish agent, that is, the cost for using i is known only to agent i and is equal to
some non-negative value ti. The social choice function f must choose a feasible
subset in F ; we can use the same notation above for single-parameter agents
with the restriction that fi(b) ∈ {0, 1} to mean that the element controlled by
agent i is either chosen by f , with fi(b) = 1, or not, with fi(b) = 0. Here
our objective is social cost minimization, that is, f∗(b) ∈ arg minx
∑n
i=1 bi(x).
Several problems on graphs can be cast in this framework.
3 Warm-up: Shortest Path with Two-values Domains
Before stating our main results, we will illustrate our approach by providing a
characterization for a simpler setting: specifically, we consider the path auction
problem discussed in the introduction; this is a special case of a set system
problem where the set of feasible solutions is the set of all the paths between
the source node s and the destination node t in a given graph G. Moreover,
we consider the case in which G has two parallel paths from the source to the
destination; the first is comprised of a set T of t edges, that we will sometimes
call top edges, whilst the second is comprised of a set B of b edges, that we will
call bottom edges. Without loss of generality, we assume that t ≥ b.
Proposition 1. There is an OSP optimal mechanism for the shortest path prob-
lem on parallel paths and two-value domains D = {L,H}n if and only if either
(1) b = 1 or (2) t > b > 1 and HL ≤ t−1b−1 .
Proof (Sketch). Let us start by proving the sufficient condition. Consider the
optimal mechanism that returns the bottom path in case of ties. By a case
analysis, one can prove that under the hypotheses of the theorem: (i) For any
top edge e, if the corresponding agent reports H, then the bottom path is chosen,
i.e., fe(H,b−e) = 0 for all b−e; (ii) For any bottom edge e, if the corresponding
agent reports L, then the bottom path is chosen, i.e., fe(L,a−e) = 1 for all a−e.
Since fe(·) is either 0 or 1 for this problem, the two items above imply that OSP
2CMON, and thus, by Theorem 2, OSP CMON holds for every agent e.
We next prove the necessity and show that when either (i) t = b > 1 or (ii)
t > b > 1 and HL >
t−1
b−1 , no optimal mechanism M can be OSP. Since M is
optimal, it is not trivial and at some point it must separate L from H for at
least one agent. We consider the first divergent agent e, and show via a simple
case analysis, that OSP 2CMON is violated for this agent, thus implying that
mechanism M is not OSP (Theorem 1). uunionsq
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4 Set systems
In this section we characterize when OSP optimal mechanisms exist for set sys-
tems. We will formally define the concept of alignment introduced above, with a
different and more technical terminology. The main message is that the feasibil-
ity of OSP optimal mechanisms depends on structural properties of the feasible
solutions and the values in the agents’ domains.
To this aim, let us first introduce the key concepts. Consider a set system
problem (E,F ,D). where D = (De)e∈E denotes the domain. We next define
some useful concepts and notation, to state our characterization and mechanism.
Consider an arbitrary subdomain D˜ of D, that is, a type domain D˜ = (D˜e)e∈E
such that D˜e ⊆ De for all e ∈ E. We denote by L(e, D˜) = min{t ∈ D˜e} and
H(e, D˜) = max{t ∈ D˜e} the lowest and the highest type for e according to
the subdomain D˜. Similarly, for any P ⊆ E, we let L(P, D˜) and H(P, D˜) be
the lowest and the highest possible cost of P according to subdomain D˜, i.e.,
L(P, D˜) =
∑
e∈P L(e, D˜) and H(P, D˜) =
∑
e∈P H(e, D˜). (When clear from the
context, we omit the reference to D˜ in these notations.) Finally, we let ≺ denote
a total order among the feasible solutions in F ; this order will be used to select
the optimal solution to return in case of ties.
Next concepts relate implementation trees and optimal solutions.
Definition 4 (selectable solution). A feasible solution P ∈ F is said se-
lectable for a subdomain D˜ if for every other P ′ ∈ F it holds that L(P \P ′, D˜) <
H(P ′ \ P, D˜) or L(P \ P ′, D˜) = H(P ′ \ P, D˜) and P ≺ P ′.
Any implementation tree gradually shrinks D to subdomains D˜ by querying the
agents. If the implementation tree has already shrunk to some D˜, a selectable
solution for D˜ cannot be excluded a priori because, for some profile in D˜, it
is either the unique optimum or the optimum preferred according to the tie-
breaking rule. Observe that at least one selectable solution exists for every D˜.
While the above concept refers only to implementation tree and optimality,
the next will turn out to be useful to study when there is a way to shrink D that
returns an optimal solution but also that is compatible with OSP.
Definition 5 (strongly selectable solution). A selectable solution P is said
strongly selectable for a subdomain D˜ if, for all e ∈ P , it continues to be se-
lectable even for the subdomain (D˜−e, H(e, D˜)), where D˜−f = (D˜e)e 6=f and, with
a slight abuse of notation, H(e, D˜) denotes {H(e, D˜)}.
In words, this means that solution P is still potentially optimum when any one
of its elements has the largest possible cost H(e, D˜) in D˜.
The Analytical Characterization: Necessary Conditions. Our next two
lemmas identify necessary conditions for the implementation tree of an OSP
optimal mechanism for set systems. To this aim, we define the obstacle domain
set X to contain D and, for each f with |Df | > 2, D˜>f = (D−f , D˜>f ), where
D˜>f = Df \ L(f,D), and D˜
⊥
f = (D−f , D˜⊥f ), where D˜⊥f = Df \H(f,D).
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The first necessary condition roughly says that if there is a domain in the
obstacle domain set X where elements of strongly selectable solutions can be
excluded when they reveal their type to be as low as possible, then there is no
implementation tree which yields an OSP optimal mechanism.
Lemma 1. There is no OSP optimal mechanism for a set system problem if
there is a domain D˜ ∈ X such that the following properties are both satisfied:
(i) the set S of strongly selectable solutions for D˜ contains at least one P with
f ∈ P such that |D˜f | > 1;
(ii) for every P ∈ S and every f ∈ P such that |D˜f | > 1, there is P¯f ∈ S with
f 6∈ P¯f such that P¯f remains selectable even for (D˜−f , L(f, D˜)).
Proof (Sketch). Assume by contradiction that there is a domain D˜ ∈ X for which
the conditions above are satisfied and yet there is an OSP optimal mechanism
M; let us denote with T its implementation tree.
Let S be the set of strongly selectable solutions defined in the statement,
which is not empty by hypothesis. Consider the first node u ∈ T in which
an agent f ∈ ⋃P∈S P diverges between L(f, D˜) and H(f, D˜) in the subtree
compatible with the type of every agent e ∈ ⋃P∈S P being in D˜e and the type of
every remaining agent e being H(e, D˜). First, observe that, since the mechanism
M is optimal, such a node u must exist.
Given the existence of u and f as above, we then apply the hypothesis (ii)
to show a negative OSP 2-cycle. uunionsq
The second necessary property regards domains D˜ ∈ X for which there are
solutions that are selectable but not strongly selectable. For each such solution
P there is an agent w, that we will call the witness of P , such that P is no longer
selectable for D˜hw = (D˜−w, H(w, D˜)).
The next lemma intuitively says that, if there exist domains where witnesses
of solutions that are selectable but not strongly selectable can be excluded (in-
cluded, respectively) when they reveal their type to be the lowest (highest, re-
spectively) possible, then there is no implementation tree which yields an OSP
optimal mechanism. Its proof uses ideas similar to that of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. There is no OSP optimal mechanism for a set system problem if
there is a domain D˜ ∈ X such that the following properties are both satisfied:
(i) the set S of selectable solutions for D˜ has size |S| ≥ 2, and there is at least
one P ∈ S such that P is not strongly selectable;
(ii) for every f for which there is at least one selectable solution to which it
belongs and at least one selectable to which it does not belong (i.e., f ∈⋃
(P,P ′)∈S×S P \ P ′) both the following are true:
• there is P¯f ∈ S s.t. f /∈ P¯f and P¯f is selectable for D¯ = (D˜−f , L(f, D˜));
• there is Pˇf ∈ S s.t. f ∈ Pˇf and Pˇf is selectable for Dˇ = (D˜−f , H(f, D˜)).
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The Analytical Characterization: The Mechanism. The two necessary
conditions suggest that it is possible to design an OSP optimal mechanism when
both the following properties are satisfied for some subdomain D˜ containing more
than one instance. When all selectable solutions are also strongly selectable then
there is an f such that every P ′ with f /∈ P ′ ceases to be selectable if the
type of f is L(f, D˜) (this is the negation of Lemma 1). Moreover, if there is at
least one selectable solution that is not strongly selectable for D˜, then there is
f such that either every P ′ with f /∈ P ′ ceases to be selectable if the type of
f is L(f, D˜), or every P ′ with f ∈ P ′ ceases to be selectable if the type of f
is H(f, D˜) (this is the negation of Lemma 2). We prove that these properties
are indeed sufficient by proving that Algorithm 1 admit payments for an OSP
optimal mechanism, that we callMoptset , for set systems with three-value domains,
i.e., with De ⊆ {Le,Me, He} with Le < Me < He for every e.
Theorem 3. There is an OSP optimal mechanism for a set system problem
with three-value domains if and only if there is no domain D˜ ∈ X for which
conditions of Lemma 1 or of Lemma 2 hold.
The “only if” direction follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. For the “if” direc-
tion, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If the properties of Lemma 1 or of Lemma 2 are not satisfied for
every domain D˜ ∈ X , then they are not satisfied for every subdomain Dˆ of D.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof (Sketch of Theorem 3). According to Lemma 3, we can assume that for
every subdomain of D the conditions of Lemmas 1 and 2 do not hold. The
algorithm looks for an agent f we can safely ask for OSP-ness to diverge between
their current L(f) and H(f); if f reveals type L(f), then she will be securely
selected, or if she reveals type H(f), then she will be never selected. This shows
that to each query that the mechanism does, there does not correspond a negative
weight two-cycle in the OSP-graph of the queried agent. By Theorem 2 we can
then conclude that Moptset is OSP.
Finally, the only solution in P at the end of the mechanism is by definition
selectable for the final subdomain D˜. To argue about optimality, we need to make
sure that all the solutions excluded for bigger subdomains are not selectable for
D˜. The last key piece of the puzzle is a property of inheritance: the solutions
removed for bigger subdomain, because they were not selectable, remain non-
selectable for all the smaller domains. uunionsq
Note that the mechanismsMoptset runs in polynomial time, since it makes at most
2 queries to each agent. Interestingly, this mechanism is not a DA auction or a
PCA. Indeed, it may require that single agents are involved first in an ascending
phase and then in a descending phase or vice versa. In fact, it is not hard to see
that this occurs even with a very simple example with only two feasible solutions,
say P and Q, and three elements, x, y, and z, with P = {x, y}, and Q = {z},
with domains Dx = Dy = Dz = {L,M,H}, where L = 1, M = 3, and H = 7.
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Input: E,F ,D
Output: An optimal solution
1 Initialize R = {P ∈ F : P not selectable for D}, P = F \R and D˜ = D
2 while |R| < |F| − 1 do
3 while there is P ∈ P that is not strongly selectable for D˜ do
4 if ∃f ∈ ⋃
P∈P P s.t. every P ∈ P, with f /∈ P , is not selectable for
(D˜−f , L(f, D˜)) then
5 Ask f if her type is L(f, D˜)
6 if yes then
7 D˜ = (D˜−f , L(f, D˜))
8 Add to R and remove from P every P not selectable for D˜
9 else
10 D˜ = (D˜−f , Df \ L(f, D˜))
11 Add to R and remove from P every P not selectable for D˜
12 else
13 Pick f ∈ ⋃
P∈P P s.t. all P ∈ P, with f ∈ P , are not selectable for
(D˜−f , H(f, D˜))
14 Ask f if her type is H(f, D˜)
15 if yes then
16 D˜ = (D˜−f , H(f, D˜))
17 Add to R and remove from P every P not selectable for D˜
18 else
19 D˜ = (D˜−f , Df \H(f, D˜))
20 Add to R and remove from P every P not selectable for D˜
21 if |R| < |F| − 1 then
22 Pick f ∈ ⋃
P∈P P s.t. every P ∈ P, with f /∈ P , are not selectable for
(D˜−f , L(f, D˜))
23 Ask f if her type is L(f, D˜)
24 if yes then
25 D˜ = (D˜−f , L(f, D˜))
26 Add to R and remove from P every P that is not selectable for D˜
27 else
28 D˜ = (D˜−f , Df \ L(f, D˜))
29 Add to R and remove from P every P that is not selectable for D˜
30 Return the only solution in P
Algorithm 1: The implementation tree of the optimal algorithm for mech-
anism Moptset
The Algorithmic Characterization. Note that the obstacle domain set con-
tains at most 2|E| + 1 domains. So we can enumerate all elements in this set
in time that is polynomial in the size of the set system instance. Observe also
that it takes only polynomial time (in the number of feasible solutions) to verify
whether a solution is (strongly) selectable or not. Hence, the testing algorithm,
that for every domain in the obstacle domain set checks for whether the condi-
tions of Lemmas 1 and Lemma 2 are satisfied, is a polynomial-time algorithm.
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